Abstract: Like in any other Muslim countries, an analysis of Islamic space in Indonesia cannot ignore the jihadist movements that took shape there. Since the reformation era, Indonesians have witnessed a number of bloody tragedies, ranging from religious conflicts in Ambon, attacks to the Western embassies offices, to the deadliest suicide bombings in Bali. All aforementioned attacks entails that a terrorist group operating in Southeast Asia called Jama'ah Islamiyyah does exist. The article deals with the historical account of the transformation of Indonesian jihadist movements. It will discuss, first, the intellectual roots of the emergence of transnational jihadist movements and, second, the Indonesian' links to the trend as Jamaah Islamiyyah has demonstrated. The "near enemy" (al-'aduww al-qarīb) and the "far enemy" (al-'aduww al-ba'īd) developed by Greges are key notions quoted as analytical tools to deal with diverse acts of jihadist movement in responde to the local and global parties perceived as anti-Islam.
Introduction
Since the collapse of Suharto's New Order (1966 -1998 and along with the political democratisation of the country, Indonesians have witnessed a number of bloody attacks, suicide bombings, and terrorism. It leads to the condemnation and accusation, including from that of the former prime minister of Singapore who maintained that Indonesia is "a nest for terrorists". The Prime Minister also accused Abu Bakar Ba'asyir as the leader of the most dangerous terrorist
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Volume 04, Number 02, December 2010 organisation operating in Southeast Asia, Jamaah Islamiyyah. 1 However, the attacks and suicide bombings are not peculiar to Indonesia since a number of other Muslim countries and western states were also experiencing similar threat of terrorism.
The article deals with two main issues. First, is the issue of the intellectual roots of jihadist movements. To discuss this point, the paper will argue that current Indonesian jihadist movements demonstrated the continuation and change of jihadist ideology transferred from the Middle East. It is the Afghan War and the New Order politics which had paved the way to the rise of transnational jihadist networks in Indonesia. During of the Afghan War, hundreds of Indonesians, mainly those who were in favour of jihad against the denounced heretic rulers of the New Order, made their hijrah (fleeing) to neighbouring country, Malaysia, as the station for the next jihad to set Afghanistan free from the Atheist Russian Armies. In addition, the journey was also aimed at strengthening the previous rebellion movement, Darul Islam, militias and to wage jihad in Indonesia as they went home.
Second, is the issue of the backdrop of Indonesian jihadist movements and the emergence of Indonesian transnational jihadist like Jamaah Islamiyyah. The emergence of this allegedly terrorist organisation implies the existence of the global trend of jihadist movements. The late twentieth century, however, has witnessed the shifting paradigm of Indonesian jihadist movements, from al-'aduww alqarīb (near enemies) to al-'aduww al-ba'īd (far enemies). This shift in paradigm is something that similar movements in the Middle East have experienced.
Jihadist Movements: an Overview
In the recent debates over Islam, the idea of jihad has been invoked quite regularly. Keppel assumes that jihad is the central topic of contemporary Islamist ideology. 2 Ahmed Rashid in the meantime argues that it refers to radical Islamist groups, 3 attachment to local values and resistance against homogenising trends of globalisation 4 . A radical anti-Islam scholar says that it represents as a proof of innate violence and incompatibility of Islam and civilised norms. 5 Monte Palmer and Princess Palmer however draw their attention on the current aggressive jihadist movements which they identified as revolutionary groups launching jihad or Holy War against the United States, Israel, Europe and anyone else who opposes their vision of a world governed by shari> 'ah. 6 Supported by multitude schools, charitable associations, banks, business activities and Islamic world's governments, these revolutionary movements attempt to elevate the status of jihad in Muslim consciousness and make it equal with the five pillars of Islam (profession of faith, prayer, fasting, alms-giving and pilgrimage). In contrast to consensus (ijmā') of majority of the 'ulamā, they consider jihad as a permanent and personal obligation (fard} 'ayn) and a vital pillar of Islam. 7 These jihadist movements draw their primary inspiration from the twelfth century scholar, Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) , who persuasively argued that Islam requires state power and proclaimed that MongolMuslims who had conquered the core of Islamic world as infidels and unbelievers which had to be fought against. 8 It was in the beginning of the eighteenth century when the Ottoman Empire had entered military and economic crises, a politically ambitious 'ulamā of Arab, Muh} ammad bin 'Abd al-Wahha> b (d. 1792), reinstalled Ibn Taymi> ya's spirits for the sake of his ethnic supremacy. He began with making a
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Volume 04, Number 02, December 2010 faithful alliance with Muh} ammad ibn Su`u> d and called Muslims to learn and think for themselves ('ijtihād), and reject the blind imitation (taqli> d) by resorting to Qur'a> n and Sunnah. He prescribed jihad against all wicked heretics (bid'a) and called for solution through the purity of tauhīd. 9 In politics, Wahhab considered the Turk as a threat to Arab supremacy and called for jihad against the 'ajam (non-Arab) domination. 10 The next influential Muslim thinker of jihadist movement is H{ assa> n al-Banna> . Unlike Ibn Taymi> yah and 'Abd alWahha> b, al-Banna> 's contribution to jihadist vision is his recognition of Europe (and the West in general) as an intellectual as well as physical threat. 11 He called Muslim to fight against Westernisation and the "mental colonisation" of Muslim through Islamic education. The first battlefield, according to him, would be against unbeliever who had occupied Islamic territory and afterward jihad would reach out to include the rest of the world. In 1928, al-Banna> founded the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwa> n al-Muslimi> n) to carry out his plan. 12 Held responsible for the assassination of the prime minister of Egypt in December 1948, he was killed by the Egyptian Police. However, his legacy, the al-Ikhwa> n al-Muslimi> n, still existed as the armed group which has been involved in numerous violent attacks in the Middle East.
Perhaps the greatest influential thinker and activist of the alIkhwan al-Muslimin is an Egyptian militant, Sayyid Qut} b . Qut} b began his life as a literary critic, open to ideas and influences from the West. But after his travel to the United States from 1948 to 12 Though the Muslim Brotherhood did not engage in Egyptian politics and focused on the da'wa (missionary) activities through the establishment of Islamic social services, like medical clinics and religious schools, it also said that the Brotherhood run its secret armed factions which were ready to engage in jihad with British and, once the colonial powers left, with the secular Egyptian governments that replaced them. Richard P. Mitchel, The Society of the Muslim Brotherhood (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969) 1950, he became a strong critic of the West. 13 Upon his return to Egypt in 1950, Qut} b joined al-Ikhwa> n al-Muslimi> n. 14 As a consequence of his activism, the Egyptian government sent him to prison in 1954. While in prison, Qut} b produced his two important works, exegesis of the Qur'a> n called Fī Z{ ilāl al-Qur'a> n (in the Shade of the Qur'a> n) and Ma'ālim all-T{ arīq (Milestone); all of which have become bestseller in jihadist circles and provided much of the ideological and theological foundations for modern jihad. 15 Qut} b introduced the concept of ignorance (jahiliya) and jihad in his Islamic interpretation. Jahiliya, according to Qut} b, refers to all man-made practices and ideologies, therefore they are against Islam. Like Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Abd alWahhab, he called for the purification of tauhīd by calling back to the Qur'a> n and Sunnah in order to pull out Muslim from ignorance. In politics, he identified all political systems which were not based on the Qur'a> n and Sunnah as false religion and encouraged Muslims to live under shariah. He supported the idea of fighting against the unbelievers and equally against Muslims whom Qut} b accused of refusing to recognise the absolute lordship of God. He called Muslims to commit jiha> d which he thought as an everlasting religious obligation for Muslims in responding to endless adversary of Jews, Christians and unbelievers. Unlike al-Banna> , Qut} b accused Egyptian 'ulamā, in particular those of al-Azhar University, of selling out Islam by legitimizing their rulers. Thus the most dangerous bid'ah (heresy), they spread throughout the Muslim world was, for Qut} b, the notion that Islam was not a revolutionary religion. Furthermore, he insisted that struggle against the political domination of the tyranny (ţa> ghu> t) is obligatory. 16 In politics, Qut} b was inspired by an Indian political activist, Sayyid Abu> A'la> al-Mawdu> di> . Al-Mawdu> di> believed that the primary duty for every Muslim is to revive Islamic politics and to resist the occupying foreigners. The vision was translated into the belief that God alone is sovereignty as a consequence of the purity of tauh} īd. This sovereignty expands to all human activities, including politics. Therefore, the truthful state, according to him, must take the form of a global Islamic government or khila> fah. This government runs "theodemocracy" through which the whole representatives of Muslims communities (majlis shu> rā) were assigned to interpret the laws of God and to elect the 'amīr (the leader). For this ideal to realise, al-Mawdu> di> believed, jiha> d is the only means.
However, it is worthwhile to note, as Fawas A. Greges points out, that all jihadist movements, before the 1990s, intended to strike ultimately against the rulers of their own homelands. Both al-Banna> and Qut} b struggled against nationalist-secular Egyptian rulers, whereas al-Mawdu> di> called for jiha> d against Indian Hindu-rulers. They embattled against their own rulers within national framework in order to create an Islamic state, which encompasses earthly political power. Prior to the mid-1990s, jihadist movements' enemies are their own nationalists and secular rulers to which Greges attributes as "the near enemy" (al-'aduww al-qarīb) . 17 However, since the collapse of Soviet Union and the end of Afghan war, there has been a new shift of focus away from localism and toward globalism against the "far enemy" (al-'aduww al-ba'īd) . 18 The Afghan war (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) was an important event and locus for all jihadits groups, which contained of thousands of 17 Greges, The Far Enemy, pp. 13-14 18 Greges urged that the shift related to two events: 1) the 1991 Gulf War and the permanent stationing of Americans forces in Saudi Arabia, 2) the defeat of religious nationalist on their home turf by the end of the 1990s. Greges, The Far Enemy, p. 30. militants from different nationalities, 19 to exercise their military capabilities and to establish secure bases for their military trainings. 20 The rising global jiha> d started when, in February 1989, the Soviet Union withdrew their military equipments and troops from Afghanistan and large quantities of its military hardware were donated to the newly independent Afghanistan. The end of war against atheistenemy brought problems within the Afghan war fighters as they debated what had to be done then after their victory in the battle, who should rule Afghanistan and whether the battle would still be continued against other enemies, the West or their homeland rulers. The debate brought further disunity among the Afghan War militias and created various splinter-groups that are divided into three groups. 21 First group is 'diaporic revolutionary militias' who decided to continue the battle in other Muslim land battlefields, such as in Palestine. They perceived that the coming duty after freeing Afghanistan is to set Palestine freedom. Second is 'retired militias' who decided to stop the battle and prefer to live in their own country and avoided military and political activities. This groups initially was influenced by Saudi-wahhabi factions that during the first Gulf War (1991), in favour of the United States and refrained from being military activated after the end of the Afghan war. 22 Contradicted to the two 19 According to Rasyid, between 1982 and 1992, around 21 Greges argues that the jihadists, after the end of Afghan War, split into two; first militias were in favour of transnational jihadits through internationalising jihad and exporting the Islamic revolution worldwide, and second, religious nationalist militias whose main objective to make sure that Islamic revolution succeeded at home. Greges, The Far Enemy, p. 25. It is a Jordanian-Palestinian activist, `Abdullah Azzam (1941 -1989 , who firstly set the ideological base for the coming global jihad. He called for battle against Christian encroachment on former Muslim lands by transcending national identities and backgrounds. He rejected internal Muslim infighting as trial (fitna) and supported conflicts on Philippines, Palestine and even Spain. In the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in 1979, Azzam issued a fatwā, supported by Saudi Arabia's Grand Mufti, 'Abd al-Aziz bin Baz, rulling that both the Afghan and the Palestinian struggles were jihad and killing infidels (kuffa> r) was a religious duty for all Muslims, otherwise they would fall into a great sin. 23 Another leading figure in the global jihad is the leader of jihad group of Egypt, Ayman al-Zawa> hiri> who arrived in the Afghan battlefield in the 1980s. Through his memoir released after 11 September attacks, he superimposed that the awaited jiha> d is coming. The present jiha> d, he stated, is against the superpower states that have dominated the globe, the United States and its allies. He claimed that Afghanistan was no more than a military training ground for the "awaited battle" and invited all trained militias to wage jiha> d against the United States. 24 Peninsula) stating that people should join forces and support each other to get rid of the main unbelievers (kufr) who have been controlling the Muslim world. For bin Laden, there was not more important duty than pushing the American enemy out of the Two Holy lands. Referring to Ibn Taimiyya, he said "to fight in defence of religion and belief is a collective duty; there is no other duty after belief that fighting the enemy who is corrupting the life and the religion." Again on 23 February 1998, bin Laden issued a fatwā, under the banner of "World Islamic Front for Jiha> d against the Jews and Crusaders," asserting that it is religious duty for all Muslims to wage war against the United States' citizens, both military and civilians, anywhere in the world. 25 Along with these promoted hatred, from 2000 to 2003, 100 of more than 300 suicide attacks were undertook by bin Laden's al-Qaeda and killed thousands people in 17 countries.
The Indonesian Jihadist Movement
Though majority of scholars agreed that the coming and spread of Islam Indonesian is in peaceful manners, unlike that of Persian and India which was mainly by military invasion and political forces, 26 according to Ricklefs, the facts sometimes showed the otherwise. The fact is that in the sixteenth century Sumatra, Java and the seventeenth Sulawesi, Islamisation is often followed by conquest and Islam was spread out not only by persuasion and commercial pressure, but also by the sword under the banner of jiha> d. 27 The early nineteenth-century West Sumatra witnessed the emergence of the Muslim militants group, Padri, whose vision is to elevate Islamic laws to a position of preeminence. Under the influence of a likely Wahabi movement in Saudi Arabia, the movement was involved in warfare against the traditional custom (adat) of Minangkabau which was denounced as jahili. 28 In 1830, the nineteenth century Java also observed landlord revolt of Diponegoro, a rebellion popularly known as the "Java war." The war was provoked by the refusal of the royal family of the Yogyakarta sultanate to nominate Diponegoro succeeding his father on the basis of the non-royal origins of his mother, to which the Dutch installed their fear of his Islamic orientation. In 1825, some of his property, including land on which his palace stood, were confiscated and Diponegoro reacted by waging jiha> d against both the Yogyakarta Sultanate and the Dutch. 29 The battle in the name of jiha> d also had an effect on the Acehnese war against Dutch. The war began in 1873 and, in 1881, the Acehnese 'ulamā declared the war as jiha> d fi> sabi> l Alla> h (war in path of God). In addition, a series of peasants' revolts also occurred along the archipelago, initially in Java and Sumatera islands, under the banner of jiha> d. The spirit of jiha> d, highlighted by hatred toward Dutch-collonial that was identified as the infidels, remained the canopy of those struggles.
As the rise of nationalism in the Muslim world in the early twentieth-century, the Indonesian jihadist episodes revealed a major shift. Unlike that of prior to the twentieth-century, establishing an independent nation-state was the popular vision of multitude Indonesian jihadist movements. Unlike that of the Padri, Diponegoro and Acehnese which nuanced in a limited area and locally oriented -if not to mention based on personal/individual interests, the twentiethcentury Indonesian jihadist movements had vision to establish an independence national-state as the Nahdlatul Ulama's case that issued 28 Though the movement was defeated in 1837", thanks to Dutch military invasion, Padri movement successfully caused an increasing penetration of Islam into Minangkabau society as reflected through the Minangkabau's principles of "agamo mangato, adat mamakai" (religion rules, while adat practices), a new regulation that categorically condemned jahili adat as forbidden. Karel Steenbrink, Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam: Contacts and Conflicts 1596-1950 a fatwa "jiha> d against the Dutch." 30 A number of paramilitary bodies were founded in responding to the Dutch and put their efforts for creating an independent state, despite the fact that some others were involved in politics. The struggle for a state-regulated country within national frameworks coloured their struggles and still continued in the era of Japanese rules (1942) (1943) (1944) (1945) .
The year after the Indonesian independence was the next episode for jiha> d in Indonesia as it was the political test for Islamic groups to recognise a newly established 'Indonesia secular-state.' It had generated a long tough tension and conflict between proponents of Islamic state and nationalists. The tension culminated when the government abrogated -latter known as-"Seven Words formulation," stating "Belief in Almighty God with the obligation for its Bambu, Masa Depan Demokrasi Terpimpin (1959 -1965 36 On 15 December 1963, with the slogan "Selamatkan Sulawesi!" (Save Sulawesi!), he decided to sever all political links with Javanese Indonesia as the only means of saving Sulawesi from Javanese domination or "Majapahitism." 37 The However, the government successfully put the armed guerrilla of Qahhar and his militias to an end as, on 3 February 1965, Qahhar was killed in Lasolo. 38 The further historical stage of Indonesian jihadist is when Soeharto assumed the political power of the state replacing Sukarno' Old Order. Tantamount to that of the Old Order, the Islamic rebellions under the banner of jiha> d had still continued during the New Order. 40 As with Komando Jihad, Jamaah Imran, founded in 1980 in Cimahi, West Java, was another jihadist movement against the Pancasila state. The Jamaah was headed by Imran bin Muhammad Zein who proclaimed jiha> d against the heretic ruler of the New Order. The Jamaah activities were ended when, in August 1980, the Indonesian police attacked the Jamaah's base activities, Istiqamah mosque. Forty four members of the Jamaah were arrested, whereas the leader, together with some of his followers, successfully escaped from the attack. In 11 March 1981, Imran and his followers fought back as they attacked the Cicendo police office in Bandung. Two weeks later, five of his follower hijacked the Garuda Indonesian Airplane and forced the pilot to land the plane in Don Muang Airport, Bangkok. 41 Though the New Order government aggressively attacked those Islamic rebellion movements, initially the regime failed to completely prevent their latent political activities as, due to the state aggressive repression, Islamic militants built their clandestine networks which fostered further jiha> d episode in Indonesia. In addition, these militant activists secretly transferred and distributed ideas of Middle Eastern jihadist ideologies, such as of Qut} b, al-Mawdu> di> , al-Banna> , through sermons, h} alaqah (religious study club alike) and mabit (literally means staying or extensive study on Islam) and publications. The core targets of those activities are university students, especially in Yogyakarta and Bandung, which eventually created militant-Muslim networks. 42 In addition, the aggressive attitudes of the New Order government had also generated the leaders of militant movements to leave the country. However, communication and interaction among leaders kept maintained, initially through da'wah activism. When the Afghan War broke up, they sent hundreds militant cadres from Malaysia and Indonesia to participate in the battlefield against Russian armies and to have military trainings. The Afghan War had created fundamental momentum for the next development of jihadist movements in Indonesian. Not only did the Afghan War provide Indonesian jihadist the future expansion of ideologies, networks, linking IndonesiaAfghanistan-Middle East, and financial supports, but also it served as 41 Ibid., p. 277. an opportunity to exercise their capabilities in weaponry and war strategies. 43
The Emergence of Jamaah Islamiyyah
The Afghan war was seen as a useful training ground for a future jiha> d in Indonesia and other Muslim countries as Indonesians started to witness a major shift among Indonesian jihadits after the war ended. 44 Hundreds Indonesians were sent to Afghanistan to be military trained in Peshawar and to join coalition with other jihadists from Muslim countries in the battlefield against the atheist-Russian armies. 45 In addition, as with other global jihad groups, the Afghan war had also transformed the ideological orientation of Indonesian jihadists from national-oriented movement to the global war against al-'aduww al-ba'īd (the far enemy) as Jamaah Islamiyyah demonstrated.
Jamaah Islamiyyah grew out of the effort of two radical Muslim clerics, Abdullah Sungkar (d. 1999) and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. Jamaah Islamiyyah is believed as the descendant of earlier Muslim rebellion movement, Darul Islam, and of more recent transnational Islamic networks, particularly individuals who gained practical jiha> d experiences in Afghanistan and fostered close ties with al Qaeda. 46 The establishment of Jamaah Islamiyyah however would take us to the 1970s Indonesian politics when the New Order' efforts tried to pacify left-wings nationalists and Islamic groups and to campaign Pancasila as the sole ideology of the state (asas tunggal Pancasila). 47 state of intimidating Muslims' leaders and disseminating false religion. They consider recognizing Pancasila is tantamount to violating Islamic norms. To do so, in 1972, they established a salafi pesantren of AlMukmin in Ngruki, Solo, Central Java (well-known as Ngruki pesantren) and built clandestine networks of radicals through Jamaah Islamiyyah. 48 They prohibited their Ngruki' santris (students) to hold any flag-ceremonies (upacara bendera) or salute the Indonesian flag which was considered as a part of bid'a (innovation). In the late 1970s, Ba'asyir circulated Risalah Jihad dan Hijrah In April 1982, the Regional Court (Pengadilan Negeri) of Surakarta sentenced both Sungkar and Ba'asyir to nine years of detention. Both appealed to the Provincial Court (Pengadilan Tinggi) that then sentenced to three years and ten months detention, equivalent to their pre-trial detention, and were released on 9 September 1982. The Provincial Court's decision left Sungkar and Ba'ayir dissatisfied and they brought another appeal to the Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung/MA), concerning the Provincial Court's decision. On 2 March 1985, when the Supreme Court was about to announce its decision, Sungkar and Ba'asyir did not show up in the court and made hijrah (fleeing) 50 to Malaysia. According to Ba'asyir, his hijrah was necessary because the government illegitimately forced Indonesians to accept the Pancasila as the sole ideology. As he could not accept the government's programme and initially could not challenge it, Ba'asyir claimed that he had no choice but to make hijrah. 51 During their two years of freedom in Central Java prior to fleeing to Malaysia in 1985, Sungkar and Ba'asyir successfully extended Jamaah Islamiyyah's network through usrah activists of the Sudirman Mosque (Masjid Sudirman) in Yogyakarta. The Masjid Sudirman, often known as Masjid Colombo, is well-known for its Islamic preachers (muballigh) who were as devoted to opposing the Suharto regime as they were to the strict implementation of Sharia law. Among the leading muballighs associated with the Sudirman mosque were Irfan S. 50 Hijrah means "to cut someone off from friendly association" or "to avoid association with". Historically, it is a political concept by which Prophet Muhammad conducted in order to avoid the struggle with the people in Mecca and made his hijrah to Medina where he established an Islamic community which eventually was used to attack his homeland. Therefore, hijrah is not only a withdrawing action from the surroundings, but also as a strategy to fight back. See, W. Montgomery Watt, "Hidjra," Encyclopaedia of Islam, edited by P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W.P. Heinrichs, volume III (Brill, 2008) Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, training was aimed at militarily strengthening Darul Islam and to wage jiha> d in Indonesia as they went home. Ajengan Masduki, another Darul Islam leader, was assigned to supply Indonesian cadres for the training. 54 The first-half of the 1990s, jiha> d fighters in Afghanistan however witnessed a major shift by the rise of a new jiha> d organisation, Taliban, supported by the native Afghans. 55 This body harshly attacked other factions of jiha> d fighters, including the Tanzim Ittihad-e-Islamiy to which Jamaah Islamiyyah took it as shelter in Afghanistan. Avoiding the clash, Jamaah Islamiyah cadres managed to leave Afghanistan and, perhaps either because of the harsh political environment in Indonesia or the desire to be closer to their teachers (Sungkar and Ba'asyir) , they opted to stay in Malaysia. 56 Southeast Asia jihadists and the supporter of jihadists movements and terrorist attacks. 59 In Indonesia, Jamaah Islamiyyah had also a direct link to jihadist groups that actively engaged in sectarian conflicts. During the Moluccas Muslim-Christian conflicts, Jamaah Islamiyyah had provided secure training facilities, increased logistical support, and opportunities to undertake joint operations for many jihadits groups, such as Laskar Mujahidin and Laskar Jundullah. In addition, Jamaah Islamiyyah had also built a strong connection with al Qaeda. The link between the two can be traced back when Abdullah Sungkar travelled to Afghanistan and met Osama bin Laden in 1993-1994. 60 Although not a creation of al Qaeda, Jamaah Islamiyyah was inspired ideologically by al-Qaeda. In return, al Qaeda gained the advantage of Jamaah Islamiyyah's covert infrastructure to support its attacks. In January 2000, some Jamaah Islamiyyah members, including Hambali, had a meeting in Kuala Lumpur with several high-level al Qaeda operatives, including two 9/11 hijackers and others who were involved in planning the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000. 61 In addition, al Qaeda's plans bomb attacks on U.S. and western interests in Singapore in late 2001, which were eventually blocked, depended heavily on Jamaah Islamiyyah's clandestine infrastructure and local knowledge for surveillance of the targets and for building the truck bombs. 62 As an organisation, Jamaah Islamiyyah consists a structured leadership with the 'amīr (leader) at the top level of body and the majlis shu> ra> served as consultative council. Sungkar set as the first 'amīr and then was replaced by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir after the former died in 1999. In the operational levels, Jamaah Islamiyyah consists four territorial groups (mantiqi) with responsibilities for Jamaah Islamiyyah's operations throughout Southeast Asia; mantiqi 1 is centred in Malaysia with a branch in Singapore; mantiqi 2 covers most of Indonesia and probably becomes the source of many Jamaah Islamiyyah' operatives, mantiqi 3 has been important for training Jamaah Islamiyyah personnel and supporting its logistical networks and mantiqi 4 centred in Australia, focusing primarily on recruiting and fundraising. 63 While mantiqi are based on wide-geographical commands, the lowest level of Jamaah Islamiyyah's structure, fi> 'ah (cell), is the groundlevel which serves more operational autonomy to take action. It appears that the fi> 'ah has been significantly growing as the leaders were Apart from the increasing number of Jamaah Islamiyyah's fighthers, it is also worthy to speak of the dynamic of its public appearances, particularly after the establishment of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia/MMI (the Council of Indonesian Jiha> d Fighters) in 2000 by Ba'asyir. A number of his followers in Jamaah Islamiyyah from the very beginning contested his initiative to establish the Majelis.
However, his legacy was still influential among Jamaah Islamiyyah' cadres although they considered him as having abandoned the basic tenet of Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Jamaah Islamiyyah/PUPJI (the General Guide for the Struggle of Jamaah Islamiyyah) which defined the Jamaah as tanz} i> m al-sirr (secret organisation) and put its struggle to counter society, instead of the state. 67 The establishment had caused a long of tough and tension between moderate and radical factions of Jamaah Islamiyyah. Until, suddenly, on 19 July 2008, Ba'asyir resigned from his position as the amīr of MMI and established his Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid/JAT (the Council of the Saviour in Muslim belief) on 17 September 2008. It is argued that the resignation is not only caused by the limited control of Ba'asyir within the MMI leadership as the public appearances behind the resignation demonstrated, but also it confirms the turning point of the figure to the PUPJI principles in the struggle. 68
Conclusion
To conclude, it is argued that the ideology of jihadist is that of Middle Eastern origin and its development demonstrates the continuity and change of radical ideology in the Muslim world. The twentieth century of jihadist movements exemplifies the contemporary development of jihadist ideology as they have been transformed from targeting "the near enemy" (al-'aduww al-qarīb) to the "far enemy" (al-'aduww al-ba'īd) . In Indonesia, the New Order government's repression had paved a way of mushrooming global jihadist movements whose ideas were transferred from its origin in the Middle East to Indonesia. Sungkar and Ba'asyir are two former Darul Islam leaders who had played important roles in transforming Darul Islam ideology from national-based to transnational movement, and indeed they successfully maintained networks between Indonesia, Afghanistan and the Middle East through Jamaah Islamiyyah that has become the backbone and architect for terrors and bombing attacks in Southeast Asia.[] 
